Showing posts with label divorce lawyer. Show all posts
Showing posts with label divorce lawyer. Show all posts

Wednesday, November 27, 2019

CHANGING CHILD CUSTODY ATTORNEY TERRY BANKERT (810)235-1970

DID YOU KNOW.

MCL 722.27(1)(c) provides that in a custody dispute, a trial court, for the best interests of the child at the center of the dispute, may “modify or amend its previous judgments or orders for proper cause shown or because of change of circumstances.” 

[Principle source e-journal #71713, Unpublished 11/14/19.No.349021. ]

But the court is not permitted to “modify or amend its previous judgments or orders or issue a new order so as to change the established custodial environment of a child unless there is presented clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the child.” MCL 722.27(1)(c).

“These initial steps to changing custody— finding a change of circumstance or proper cause and not changing an established custodial environment without clear and convincing evidence—are intended to erect a barrier against removal of a child from an established custodial environment and to minimize unwarranted and disruptive changes of custody orders.” Vodvarka v Grasmeyer, 259 Mich App 499, 509; 675 NW2d 847 (2003) (quotation marks omitted). 

The first step in the analysis is to determine whether the moving party has established proper cause or a change of circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 508-509.

In McRoberts v Ferguson, 322 Mich App 125, 131-132; 910 NW2d 721 (2017), this Court explained: Proper cause means one or more appropriate grounds that have or could have a significant effect on the child’s life to the extent that a reevaluation of the child’s custodial situation should be undertaken. 

In order to establish a change of circumstances, a movant must prove that, since the entry of the last custody order, the conditions surrounding custody of the child, which have or could have a significant effect on the child’s well-being, have materially changed.

To constitute a change of circumstances under MCL 722.27(1)(c), the evidence must demonstrate something more than the normal life changes (both good and bad) that occur during the life of a child, and there must be at least some evidence that the material changes have had or will almost certainly have an effect on the child. [Citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted.] 

With respect to the issue of “proper cause,” the criteria outlined in the statutory best
interest factors, MCL 722.23, “should be relied on by a trial court in deciding if a particular fact raised by a party is a ‘proper’ or ‘appropriate’ ground to revisit custody orders.” Vodvarka, 259 Mich App at 512. 

In regard to “change of circumstances,” the relevance of facts presented should also “be[] gauged by the statutory best interest factors.” Id. at 514. “Although the threshold consideration of whether there was proper cause or a change of circumstances might be fact-intensive, the court need not necessarily conduct an evidentiary hearing on the topic.” Corporan, 282 Mich App at 605. 

In Vodvarka, 259 Mich App at 512, this Court, addressing the threshold issue, observed: Obviously, trial courts must make this factual determination case by case. Although these decisions will be based on the facts particular to each case, we do not suggest that an evidentiary hearing is necessary to resolve this initial question. 

Often times, the facts alleged to constitute proper cause or a change of circumstances will be undisputed, or the court can accept as true the facts allegedly comprising proper cause or a change of circumstances, and then decide if they are legally sufficient to satisfy the standard.

 MCR 3.210(C)(8) provides: In deciding whether an evidentiary hearing is necessary with regard to a postjudgment motion to change custody, the court must determine, by requiring an offer of proof or otherwise, whether there are contested factual issues that must be resolved in order for the court to make an informed decision on the motion.

 It is clear to us, and was effectively accepted by the trial court, that if the allegations set forth in plaintiff’s motion to modify custody are true, they would easily establish a change of circumstances and proper cause for purposes of revisiting the issue of custody under the statutory best-interest factors.

 But the trial court found it problematic that plaintiff had not submitted any statements, affidavits, reports, or other documentary evidence to support the allegations, let alone evidence that was current and relevant. 

The motion to modify custody was not verified, nor did plaintiff supply her own affidavit. MCR 3.210(C)(8) allowed the trial court to require “an offer of proof or otherwise” in relation to deciding whether to order an evidentiary hearing.

Under the circumstances of the case and given the remarks made by the trial court when ruling on the motion, the court’s hesitation and resistance at giving any weight to the allegations in plaintiff’s motion was plainly driven by the four CPS investigations instigated by plaintiff that resulted in determinations that allegations of abuse by defendant could not be substantiated.

The lack of substantiation, again and again, could reasonably call into question plaintiff’s motives and credibility on all matters.

 The trial court appeared more than open to further considering a motion to modify custody if plaintiff would come forward with supporting documentary evidence, explaining why the court took the unusual step of denying the motion without prejudice.

 Indeed, the record and the CPS history support the trial court’s decision to deny the motion to modify custody simply on the-1970 basis that plaintiff did not provide supporting documentation on the threshold issue of change of circumstances or proper cause."
Presented here by Terry Bankert Flint Divorce Attorney 810-235-1970 FlintFamilyLaw.com

Friday, February 17, 2012

FLINT CHILD CUSTODY IN DIVORCE, Flint Divorce 810-235-1970

FLINT CHILD CUSTODY IN DIVORCE




FLINT DIVORCE, CHILD CUSTODY LAWYER TAKS ABOUT JOINT CUSTODY.



It is easier to divorce today but both parents are staying more active inn their childrens live, or want to. Sometimes the old bias favoring mothers rears its head.



“...the divorce revolution and the decline of marriage has resulted in a weakening of spousal ties, but we are also experiencing the Indissolubility of parenthood with PARENTS tied together post-separation to a much greater extent than in the past.” [1/269]



“...interest in the nature of the modern family and public policies that affect families.” [1/369]



Today in Michigan there is a presumption of joint custody if one parent asks for it.



Posted here by Flint Divorce Lawyer Terry Bankert 235-1970 with office in downtown Flint across from the court house. http://www.attorneybankert.com/




“ A central tenet of the Christian Church over much of the last two Millennium has been the “ indissolubility of marriage .”[1/369] In a time when “...there were very significant religious, social, economic and legal impediments to divorce, divorce was a fault based process with only an innocent spouse able to seek termination of the marraige.[1/369]



Our world is changing and along with it are the roles of parents in child rearing.



“...” divorce revolution” and the spread of no fault divorce.[1/369]



Before there was almost a presumption the father in divorce would abandon the children.



… a failed marriage deserved a decent burial that would allow the parties to have a clean break and get on with their separate lives with each party expected to become self sufficient.”[1/370]



In the divorce revolution the”...focus of the legal process was to allocate the “ assets” of the marraige, including the children.” [1/370]. In this era mother got the children and the father had limited parenting rights usually every other weekend and some holiday time.”[1/370]



In practice , many fathers virtually disappeared from the lives of there children after separation. If the child was born out of wedlock, the father might never have any contcat.” [1/370]





Things are changing.” There has been a dramatic increase in labour force participation for women and a narrowing of the wage gap between men and women.”[1/370]





In many families the woman is now the higher income earner.[1/370]



While in most intact families the woman still plays a dominate role in the domestic sphere , men today are more engaged in child care and household management than their fathers were , and in some cases are the primary caregivers for the children.”[1/370]



Although most shared - parenting arrangements do not involve equal time with both parents, they result in many children spending more time than every second weekend with their fathers , and generally require more collaboration between parents than was the case under the old “sole custody to mother” regime. [1/370]



At the same time, as noncustodial parents, principally fathers, have been given greater rights and opportunities for participation in the lives of their children , greater obligations of child support have been imposed on them.[1/370].



It is hard to change institutions involved in Family law. This can be seen In the Genesee County Mi Friend of the Court Hand Book discussion of Custody.” This paragraph of the Judgement of Divorce dictates which person or organization will have the responsibility for the minor child and make the day to day decisions regarding the child. One of the parents of the child is usually designated as the custodial parent, but the court can decide if another another individual should be custodian.[2]



Michigan has abandoned the presumption favoring the mother as the custodial parent. Custody is contested when more than one party wishes to be the custodial parent and make timely and appropriate response to the court.[2]









No longer is the court seen as the center of the process but rather there is a range of methods for helping separated parents to restructure their relationship.[1/371]



These methods include mediation, collaborative family law, parenting coordination, and judicial case management. A trial is seen as a last resort.[1/371]



The focus is now on trying to help parents develop a cooperative approach that will allow their parenting arrangements to evolve as the circumstances and needs of the children change. [1/371]



Joint vs. Sole Custody. Note that in the definitions section of the statute, MCL §722.22, there is no definition of custody—whether legal or physical.

MCL §722.26a defines “joint custody” as follows:

(7) As used in this section, “joint custody” means an order of the court in which 1 or both of the following is specified:

(a) That the child shall reside alternately for specific periods with each of the parents.

(b) That the parents shall share decision-making authority as to the important decisions affecting the welfare of the child.

MCL §722.26a mandates the manner in which a joint award of custody is to be made:

(1) In custody disputes between parents, the parents shall be advised of joint custody. At the request of either parent, the court shall consider an award of joint custody, and shall state on the record the reasons for granting or denying a request. In other cases, joint custody may be considered by the court. The court shall determine whether joint custody is in the best interest of the child by considering the following factors:

(a) The factors enumerated.

(b) Whether the parents will be able to cooperate and generally agree concerning important decisions affecting the welfare of the child.

(2) If the parents agree on joint custody, the court shall award joint custody unless the court determines on the record, based upon clear and convincing evidence, that joint custody is not in the best interests of the child.

MCL §722.26a (3) distinguishes physical custody, providing

If the court awards joint custody, the court may include in its award a statement regarding when the child shall reside with each parent, or may provide that physical custody be shared by the parents in a manner to assure the child continuing contact with both parents. (emphasis added



The Child Custody Act provides for both sole and joint custody. MCL 722.27. Joint custody means an order of the court in which one or both of the following is specified:

(a) That the child shall reside alternately for specific periods with each of the parents.

(b) That the parents shall share decision-making authority as to the important decisions affecting the welfare of the child.

MCL 722.26a(7).

The court may award joint legal custody as to decision making but find an award of joint physical custody to be inappropriate. Wellman v Wellman, 203 Mich App 277, 512 NW2d 68 (1994) (joint physical custody denied based on parties’ inability to cooperate and communicate).

Standards for awarding sole or joint custody. In custody disputes, the parents must be advised of the availability of joint custody. MCL 722.26a(1). If the parents agree on joint custody, the court must award joint custody unless the court determines on the record, based on clear and convincing evidence, that joint custody is not in the best interests of the child. MCL 722.26a(2).

At the request of either party, the court must consider joint custody and must state on the record the reasons for granting or denying the request. MCL 722.26a(1); see Mixon v Mixon, 237 Mich App 159, 602 NW2d 406 (1999) (trial court erred in not stating on the record its reasons for denying request for joint physical custody); see also Arndt v Kasem, 156 Mich App 706, 402 NW2d 77 (1986); Wilcox v Wilcox (On Remand), 108 Mich App 488, 310 NW2d 434 (1981). However, the fact that the trial court must consider an award of joint custody does not create a presumption in favor of it. Wellman.

The court determines whether joint custody is in the best interests of the child by considering the statutory best interests factors (see §3.8) and whether the parents will be able to cooperate and generally agree concerning important decisions affecting the welfare of the child. MCL 722.26a(1).

If the parents cannot agree on essential decisions, sole custody should be awarded. Fisher v Fisher, 118 Mich App 227, 324 NW2d 582 (1982). The question is whether the parents can cooperate on child-rearing issues not whether the parents necessarily get along. Shulick v Richards, 273 Mich App 320, 729 NW2d 533 (2006) (although parties harbored some personal animosity and had some difficulty communicating, not abuse of discretion to award joint legal and physical custody because parties were able to cooperate and reach compromises for best interests of children); Nielsen v Nielsen, 163 Mich App 430, 415 NW2d 6 (1987). Depending on the facts of the individual case, it is not inconsistent to grant joint legal custody while denying joint physical custody. See Dailey v Kloenhamer, 291 Mich App 660, ___ NW2d ___ (2011) (holding that escalation of disagreements between parties and expansion of topics that parties disagreed about constituted sufficient basis for trial court to revisit custody decision and that due to its equitable nature, MCL 722.26a(7) authorizes courts in proper circumstances to grant joint physical custody to parties while granting sole legal custody to one party); Wellman.

When parents with joint legal custody cannot agree on essential matters, the court decides the issue based on the child’s best interests and must make specific findings of fact on the record. Bowers v Vandermeulen-Bowers, 278 Mich App 287, 750 NW2d 597 (2008); Lombardo v Lombardo, 202 Mich App 151, 507 NW2d 788 (1993) (decision regarding child’s educational program). The trial court may not apportion decision-making authority between the parties in the event they cannot agree. Shulick.

It is an abuse of discretion to award joint custody based solely on the court’s preference that custody should be awarded to the parent of the same sex as the child when all other custody factors are equal or weigh in favor of the parent who is not the same gender as the child. Freeman v Freeman, 163 Mich App 493, 414 NW2d 914 (1987) (error to award joint custody when court had found one parent equal or superior to other on nearly all custody criteria).

If there is a dispute regarding where the child will reside, the court must state the basis for a residency award on the record or in writing. MCL 722.26a(5).[3]





Regarding joint custody, MCL 722.26a provides:

(1) In custody disputes between parents, the parents shall be advised of joint custody. At the request of either parent, the court shall consider an award of joint custody, and shall state on the record the reasons for granting or denying a request. In other cases joint custody may be considered by the court. The court shall determine whether joint custody is in the best interest of the child by considering the following factors:

(a) The factors enumerated in [MCL 722.23].

(b) Whether the parents will be able to cooperate and generally agree concerning important decisions affecting the welfare of the child.

(2) If the parents agree on joint custody, the court shall award joint custody unless the court determines on the record, based upon clear and convincing evidence, that joint custody is not in the best interests of the child.

(3) If the court awards joint custody, the court may include in its award a statement regarding when the child shall reside with each parent, or may provide that physical custody be shared by the parents in a manner to assure the child continuing contact with both parents.

(4) During the time a child resides with a parent, that parent shall decide all routine matters concerning the child.

(5) If there is a dispute regarding residency, the court shall state the basis for a residency award on the record or in writing.

(6) Joint custody shall not eliminate the responsibility for child support. Each parent shall be responsible for child support based on the needs of the child and the actual resources of each parent. If a parent would otherwise be unable to maintain adequate housing for the child and the other parent has sufficient resources, the court may order modified support payments for a portion of housing expenses even during a period when the child is not residing in the home of the parent receiving support. An order of joint custody, in and of itself, shall not constitute grounds for modifying a support order.

(7) As used in this section, “joint custody” means an order of the court in which 1 or both of the following is specified:

(a) That the child shall reside alternately for specific periods with each of the parents.

(b) That the parents shall share decision-making authority as to the important decisions affecting the welfare of the child.





[1]

FAMILY LAW QUARTERLY , Vol. 45, No. 3, Fall 2012. Article “ The Evolution of Legal Parenthood” Family Law and the Indissoulubility of Parenthood by Partick Parkinson. Review by Nicholas Bala Professor, Faculty of Law Queens University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada.





[2]



The Friend of the Court Handbook , Genesee County Friend of the Court, 1101 Beach St. County Administration Building, Flint Michigan 48502



[3]

Michigan Family Law Benchbook ch 3 (ICLE 2d ed 2006), at http://www.icle.org/modules/books/chapter.aspx/?lib=family&book=2006553550&chapter=03
(last updated 02/03/2012).







[4]

Michigan Family Law ch 12 (Hon. Marilyn J. Kelly et al eds, ICLE 7th ed 2011), at http://www.icle.org/modules/books/chapter.aspx/?lib=family&book=2011553510&chapter=12
 (last updated 02/03/2012).









Friday, July 02, 2010

SPOUSAL SUPPORT EMMET COUNTY DIVORCE comments by Flint Divorce Attorney Terry Bankert 235-1970

Emmet County Divorce commented on by Flint Divorce Attorney Terry Bankert, 810-235-1970. Issues: Spousal support; Woodington v. Shokoohi; Gates v. Gates; Hanaway v. Hanaway; Vanalstine v. Vanalstine; Magee v. Magee


Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished 06/22/10),N0.28898, Case Name: Welsh v. Welsh

Emmet Circuit Court N0. 08-001177-DO,e-Journal Number: 46142

Judge(s): Per Curiam - Shapiro and Donofrio; Dissent - Jansen

Summary from de-Journal followed by Case with comments in CAP or [trb ] by Terry Bankert Flint Divorce lawyer , for lay understanding ans SEO.



LOCAL COURT DID IT WRONG!



The MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS held the EMMET DIVORCDE trial court's award of spousal support to the defendant-wife of $1,000 a month for three years was unfair, inequitable, and erroneous. Thus, the court remanded for a determination of an increased amount and duration of spousal support.



PRIOR TO DIVORCE HUSBAND AND WIFE HAD AN AGREEMENT



Prior to trial, the parties reached an agreement on all issues except spousal support. As part of their agreement, they stipulated to a division of the marital property with each receiving approximately $207,000 in assets.

AFTER DIVORCE WIFE SAYS SHE WANTS MORE SPOUSAL SUPPORT

On appeal, defendant challenged numerous factual findings by the trial court and contended the amount of spousal support awarded was unfair where she requested permanent spousal support of $3,000 a month.

COURT OF APPEALS AGREES WITH WIFE

The court agreed. In considering the plaintiff-husband's ability to pay alimony, the EMMET COUNTY DIVORCE trial court took into account the husband's duty to repay a loan he acquired to pay defendant for her share of the parties' real property, and noted defendant "was going to be saddled with debt to pay the settlement."

YOU CANNOT DO THAT SAYS THE HIGHER COURT

The court held this was error because the trial court should not have considered this. Plaintiff did not have less than $207,000 in assets because of this. Rather, he had to make the payment because he had more than $207,000 in assets. Defendant's spousal support calculation should not have been reduced because of this decision.

HUSBAND ASSETS ARE INCOME PRODUCING

Also, plaintiff's assets are income-producing assets because he received the business. Defendant received cash, while liquid it earns very little income.

HUSBAND MAKE MUCH MORE THAN WIFE BY A MUL;TIPE OF SEVEN!

Further, plaintiff's income substantially exceeds defendant's, who earns about $8,580 from her part-time job and her net income from a full-time similar job would be about $14,000 a year. His yearly income was about seven times that of defendant.

SPOUSAL SUPPPORT IS TO ALLOW A STANDARD OF LIVING, THE CIOURT NEEDED A BUDGET

Also, the trial court made its decision on the amount of spousal support without any information as to defendant's living expenses. The MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS court did not believe the EMMET COUNTY DIVORCE trial court rendered a fair and equitable decision.



It was error for the EMMET COUNTY DIVORCE trial court not to order a greater amount of support for a longer period of time.



This was a 35-year marriage, defendant is 54 years old, has no higher education, and her only work experience was unskilled office work. There was no basis in the record for the trial court's conclusion a three-year period of spousal support was sufficient for defendant to learn new skills and/or secure better employment.

---

BACKGROUND



THERE WAS A TRIAL

Defendant Christine Welsh appeals as of right a divorce judgment issued following a

bench trial.

THERE WAS AN AGREEMENT BEFORE THE TRIAL ALL EXCEPT SPOUSAL SUPPORT

Prior to trial, Christine and Patrick Welsh reached an agreement on all issues except

spousal support.

EACH TO GET VALUE OF $207,000

As part of their agreement, they stipulated to a division of the marital property,

with each receiving approximately $207,000 in assets.foot note 1



WIFE SAYS SHE DID NOT GET ENOUGH SPOUSAL SUPPORT



On appeal, defendant challenges numerous factual findings of the trial court, and argues that the EMMET COUNTY DIVORCE trial court’s award of spousal support of $1000 a month for 3 years, when she requested permanent spousal support of $3000 a month, was unfair and inequitable.

EMMET COUNTY DIVORCE COURT DID IT WRONG, HOW IS THIS DECISION MADE?

We agree and remand for additional proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

WHAT THERE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

“We review a trial court’s decision to award spousal support for an abuse of discretion.

Gates v Gates, 256 Mich App 420, 432; 664 NW2d 231 (2003).



A EMMET COUNTY DIVORCE trial court’s factual findings

regarding spousal support are reviewed for clear error and are presumptively correct. Id. The

appellant has the burden of showing clear error. Id. If this Court determines that the EMMET COUNTY DIVORCE trial court’s findings are not clearly erroneous, this Court must then determine whether the trial court’s decision was fair and equitable in light of the facts. Id. at 433. The trial court’s award of spousal

support must be affirmed unless this Court is firmly convinced that the award was inequitable.

Id.



WHY DOES A COURT AWARD SPOUSAL SUPPPORT?



“The objective of spousal support is to balance the incomes and needs of the parties in a

way that will not impoverish either party, and support is to be based on what is just and

reasonable under the circumstances of the case.” Woodington v Shokoohi, ___ Mich App ___;

___ NW2d ___ (Docket No. 288923, issued May 4, 2010), slip op p 2.



HOW DOES A COURT DECIDE IF THERE SHOULD BE SPOUSAL SUPPORT IF ANY?

In determining whether to award spousal support, a trial court should consider the following factors:

(1) the past relations and conduct of the parties;

(2) the length of the marriage;

(3) the abilities of the parties to work;

(4) the source and amount of property awarded to the parties;

(5) the parties’ age;

(6) the abilities of the parties to pay alimony;

(7) the present situation of the parties;

(8) the needs of the parties,

(9) the parties’ health;

(10) the prior standard of living of the parties and whether

either is responsible for the support of others;

(11) contributions of the parties to the joint estate;

(12) a party’s fault in causing the divorce;

(13) the effect of cohabitation on a party’s financial status; and

(14) general principles of equity.

[Id.]

ARE ANY OF THE ASSETS INCOME PRODUCING?

Additionally, “‘[w]here both parties are awarded substantial assets, the court, in evaluating a

claim for [spousal support], should focus on the income-earning potential of these assets and

should not evaluate a party’s ability to provide self-support by including in the amount available

for support the value of the assets themselves.’” Gates, 256 Mich App at 436, quoting Hanaway

v Hanaway, 208 Mich App 278, 296; 527 NW2d 792 (1995).2



EMMET COUNTY DIVORCE COURT DISCOUNTED WIFES AWARD BY THE LOAN COST OF HUSBAND TO0O PAY HER.



In this case, both plaintiff and defendant received $207,000 in marital assets. In

considering plaintiff’s ability to pay alimony, the trial court took into account plaintiff’s duty to

repay a loan that he had acquired to pay defendant for her share of the couple’s real property, i.e.

2 Plaintiff attempts to argue that Hanaway in distinguishable because it involved wealthy parties.

There is nothing in the opinion that limits its application to only wealthy litigants and such a

proposition is not consistent with the very premise of our judicial system. Furthermore,

Hanaway has been applied to cases where the party paying alimony made only $45,000 and

where the martial assets awarded were only $57,000. See Klesczewski v Klesczewski,

unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued August 22, 2000 (Docket No.

213288); Kaylor v Kaylor, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued

December 15, 1998 (Docket No. 204722).

WIFE AND HUSBAND RECEIVE SUBSTANTIAL ASSETS

In any event, the evidence shows that each party received $207,000 in assets. We believe that this is sufficient to constitute “substantial” assets. their house, outbuilding, and approximately 10 acres of land.

HUSBAND SADDFLED WITH PAYING WIFE

The trial court noted in its opinion that defendant was going to “be saddled with debt to pay the settlement.”

EMMET COUNTY DIVORCE COURT WAS WRONG

This was error.



HE OWED IT



That plaintiff had to take out a loan to pay defendant $119,000 of her award is of no

moment and the trial court should not have considered this. Plaintiff does not have less than

$207,000 in assets because of the loan. Rather, he had to make the payment because he had

more than $207,000 in assets—theoretically he had $326,000, thus necessitating the payment.

With plaintiff’s loan, each of the parties would net $207,000 in assets.3 Accordingly, it was

inappropriate to consider plaintiff’s required repayment of the loan when determining either his

ability to pay or the amount he should pay. Plaintiff elected to take out a loan rather than sell

assets. That was certainly his option, but defendant’s spousal support calculation may not be

reduced based on this decision.4 See Vanalstine v Vanalstine, unpublished opinion per curiam of

the Court of Appeals, issued September 22, 2005 (Docket No. 254655) (Concluding that the trial

court properly ignored that the defendant would have to mortgage his property to pay his share of

the property settlement when determining the defendant’s ability to pay spousal support because

the “defendant is not acquiring any existing debt, as he is allowed to choose whether to liquidate

or mortgage the property to plaintiff for her share of its worth”).



HUSBAND GOT THE BUSINESS AND WILL RECEIVE INCOME FROM IT

Moreover, plaintiff’s assets are income-producing assets because he received the

business. Defendant received cash that, although liquid, earns very little income. Accordingly,

although the parties received equal assets, plaintiff received the majority of the incomeproducing

assets.





WIFE MAKES $10 PER HOUR

The evidence also indicates that plaintiff’s income substantially exceeds defendant’s.

The trial court found that the 54-year-old defendant earns $10 per hour as a part-time receptionist

and that her take home pay was $330 biweekly or $8,580 per year based on the available 15 to 22

hours of work per week. The trial court concluded that her monthly net income for full-time

work would be roughly $1,168, which would be just over $14,000 per year. Although we do not

find this conclusion erroneous, the trial court did err in its calculation of plaintiff’s income by

double crediting capital improvements to the business against that income.

THE COURT COMPUTED HUSBANDS INCOME WRONG

The trial court gave plaintiff a double credit for reinvestments into his business. Plaintiff’s CPA testified that over the last six years plaintiff had put on average $22,000 per year back into the business in capital

improvements, although she anticipated that this amount would be less in the future because

much of the work was done.



While we do not take issue with the trial court’s deduction of the capital improvement

expenses from plaintiff’s annual income, the trial court based that annual income on the CPA’s

--

FOOT NOTE 3 That is to say, plaintiff still has $326,000 in assets, but has a loan of $119,000, to render his net assets $207,000.

FOOTNOTE 4 We also note that, although the trial court concluded that plaintiff did not have the ability to pay more spousal support, the conclusion was reached without any evidence as to the plaintiff’s

living expenses. Accordingly, on remand, the trial court shall make its determination of

plaintiff’s ability to pay based solely on evidence.

--

calculations, which set forth plaintiff’s “net income after taxes and depreciation.” The CPA

testified that depreciation is a representation of capital improvements for purposes of taxes,

which require the expenses to be spread out over a certain number of years. Plaintiff was not

entitled to be credited twice for the same expenses. Thus, giving him credit for the full amounts

of the annual capital improvement costs while also giving him credit for depreciation listed on

his taxes was clearly erroneous. The capital improvement expenses should have been subtracted

from the “net income after taxes and before depreciation.” By doing so, defendant’s net income

in 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007 after taxes and capital improvements was $59,181, $55,050,

$63,018, $34,137,5 and $74,924 respectively for an average of about $57,500.6 As noted above,

we agree with the trial court’s finding as to defendant’s current full-time earning potential. As a

result, the record evidence indicates that plaintiff’s yearly net income is nearly seven times that

of defendant’s present net income and just over four times that of her potential full-time net

income.



FACTORS THE COURT SHOULD USE

Lastly, although the trial court properly declined to accept some of the amounts in

defendant’s proffered budget, it erred in dismissing some categories completely rather than

limiting the amounts. The purpose of spousal support is to make certain that the parties live as

close to their previous standard of living as possible without impoverishing either party. Magee

v Magee, 218 Mich App 158, 162; 553 NW2d 363 (1996).



COURT NEEDS A COMPLETE PICTURE

The factors that the trial court is to consider are designed to provide a complete picture of each parties assets, income, expenses, and earning ability, as well as a sense of the parties prior standard of living.



Here, where the trial court had no information on plaintiff’s monthly expenses, it failed to consider any of defendant’s living expenses, it failed to consider that plaintiff received the income-producing assets, and it

improperly considered plaintiff’s loan to pay the property settlement, we do not believe the trial

court rendered a fair and equitable decision. Gates, 256 Mich App at 436.



Under these circumstances, we conclude that it was error for the trial court not to order a

greater amount of support and for a longer period. This was a 35-year marriage. Defendant is 54

years old and is without higher education, with her only real work experience being unskilled

office work and keeping simple ledgers for a small family business. We find no basis in the

record for the court’s conclusion that a three-year period is sufficient for plaintiff to “learn new

skills and/or secure better employment.”7 Given that each party received substantial assets and

---

FOOTNOTE5 This relatively low year reflected a $33,377 improvement to the outbuilding on the couple’s

property, which was to be used as an office for the building.

FOOTNOTE6 This, of course, assumes that defendant does not obtain future income as a result of these

capital expenditures and treats them as total losses.

FOOTNOTE7 The court found that defendant had previously worked full-time for Independence Village at the same job she is presently performing on a part-time basis for $10 per hour, that she had

performed some manual labor in the family landscaping business, that she had done

housecleaning for others at some point, and that she ran the office and kept the books for the

couple’s landscaping business. The court noted that plaintiff has “some limited computer skills.”

Defendant testified that when her children were young she volunteered at the schools and had a

paid position at the school for about a year. After that, she occasionally cleaned homes, briefly

provided daycare services to one little boy, worked for an agency that provided some

homemaker services through a local agency and worked for Independence Village. Defendant

described her bookkeeping duties for the landscaping business as “entering checks into a book.”

Plaintiff presented testimony from a CPA who did his taxes and who he had hired to do the

landscaping company books after he and his wife separated. She testified that the bookkeeping

duties at the company involved “paying . . . bills and doing . . . payroll” and that she had not

examined defendant’s work because defendant used a “manual system” and started fresh each

year. Plaintiff testified that defendant would organize the expenses in a ledger but that he would

calculate the figures and determine the amount of receipts, expenses and income. More

generally, he stated that in regards to bookkeeping, “I would do some of it, and Christine, I

would say, though, she had a lot to do with it.” We do not believe that any of this evidence

provides a basis to conclude that, after three years, a 55-year-old woman will have obtained

higher paying employment than she is now capable of obtaining.

---



that plaintiff received the income-earning assets (the business), as well as having a far greater

earning potential over defendant, defendant should not be expected to consume her capital to

support herself. See Hanaway, 208 Mich at 295-296.

We remand for a determination of an increased amount and duration of spousal support.

We do not retain jurisdiction.

/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro

/s/ Pat M. Donofrio



-1Foot note 1 Under the terms of the agreement, plaintiff was to receive the following: a 2002 Jeep (value

unspecified); the marital home (valued at $219,500); Patrick’s business, Country Garden &

Landscape (valued at $51,000); plaintiff’s IRA (valued at $30,000); plaintiff’s life insurance with

Genworth Annuity and Farm Bureau; plaintiff’s CD (valued at roughly $11,000); and plaintiff’s

cash accounts (valued at roughly $12,000). Defendant was to receive the following: a 2003

Pontiac (value unspecified); defendant’s 401(k) (valued at $18,000); defendant’s IRA (valued at

$5,600); defendant’s life insurance with Farm Bureau; defendant’s CD (valued at roughly

$11,000); defendant’s cash accounts (valued at roughly $51,000); and a cash payment from

plaintiff for $119,000 to equalize the property settlement.

-

Posted here by
Flint Divorce Lawyer
Terry Bankert
http://attorneybankert.com/