PAPER DAD WINS OVER BIO DAD

HOT OFF THE PRESS
Issues:
Whether the trial court properly balanced the equities against revocation of the acknowledgment of parentage; McDonald v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co.; In re Conley; MCL 722.1011(3);
Whether the trial court's decision conflicted with Van v. Zahorik; Law of the case doctrine; CAF Inv. Co. v. Saginaw Twp.; Order of filiation under MCL 722.717(1);
The Paternity Act (MCL 722.711 et seq.); The Acknowledgment of Parentage Act (MCL 722.1001 et seq.);
Standards or guidelines defining "the equities" a trial court should apply when considering the potential revocation of an acknowledgment of parentage; Due process; Lester v. Spreen; Levant v. Kowal; Ladas v. Psiharis; Sparks v Sparks; Santosky v. Kramer; Michael H v. Gerald D
[Note the information here has been prepared and modified for media presentation. My personal thoughts have bee added, [trb], consult an attorney before you rely on any comments here -Terry Bankert 07/05/08]
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Published) 07/01/2008,No. 281726,
Case Name: Sinicropi v. Mazurek, Jackson Circuit, LC# 05-002154 DP
e-Journal Number: 39801,Judge(s): Gleicher, Fitzgerald, and Hoekstra
MOM TRIES TO SAY I DID NO MEAN IT WHEN SHE SIGNED, COURT SAYS TOO BAD!
After remand for a determination whether clear and convincing evidence supported the revocation of an acknowledgment of parentage, considering the "equities of the case," the court held the trial court properly refused to revoke the acknowledgment of parentage, [PAPER DAD-TRB] signed by the defendant-mother shortly after the birth of her son, N.
IN RELATIONSHIP WITH ONE FATHER ANOTHER
The case concerned a child born out of wedlock while the mother was in a relationship with the intervening [PAPER DAD] defendant, but plaintiff is the biological father of the child as established by DNA testing.
CHILD KNOWS BIOLOGICAL DAD AS DADDY
Defendant and plaintiff claimed the equities showed N. has an ongoing relationship with[BIO DAD] plaintiff and his extended family.
PAPER DAD POOR DAD
In contrast, they argued the intervening [PAPER DAD]defendant had demonstrated particularly poor judgment (at best), which had a direct impact on his ability to act as a responsible parent to N.
BABY CALL PAPER DAD, DADDY
However, the record revealed throughout the eight years of N.'s life, he knew no father besides the intervening defendant.
IN 2005 PAPER DADDY GETS CUSTODY
The trial court awarded the intervening defendant sole physical custody of N. in 2005, finding he had "shown an enormous [parenting] capacity for a single man" and consistently put N. first.
COURT SAID BIO DAD DID NOT HAVE MEANINGFUL RELATIONSHIP WITH MINOR CHILD
In contrast, N. had only a short-lived, peripheral relationship with plaintiff, despite some possible awareness he was his biological father.
CHILD HAPPY AND THRIVING WITH PAPER DAD
The psychologist observed N. presented as a happy and "extremely enthusiastic" child, and he expressed an inability to think of "anything that he would change in his life at this time." The evidence demonstrated N. enjoyed a strong and positive bond with both the intervening defendant and defendant, performed well in school, and, in the words of the psychologist, seemed "an extremely engaging, happy and contented child who enjoys a strong relationship with all of the adults in his life, particularly his mother" and "the man he is bonded to as his father," the intervening defendant.
NO CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE
The court found no clear error in the trial court's conclusion plaintiff and defendant "failed to present clear and convincing evidence supporting revocation of the acknowledgment of parentage." Affirmed.
**** A MORE DETAILED DISCUSSION****
UPPPER ORIGIONALLY SENT IT BACK TO LOWER THEN UP HELD DECISION TO FAVOR PAPER DAD
In Sinicropi v Mazurek, 273 Mich App 149; 729 NW2d 256 (2006), we instructed the
trial court to determine on remand whether clear and convincing evidence supported the
revocation of an acknowledgment of parentage, considering the "equities of the case." Id. at
185. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the trial court refused to revoke the
acknowledgment of parentage signed by Holly Mazurek shortly after the birth of her son, Noah
Powers. Mazurek and Gregory Sinicropi, Noah’s biological father, now appeal as of right. We
affirm.
I. Underlying Facts and Proceedings

MOM HAD DATED BRIEFLY, CHILD BORN 1999
This Court’s prior opinion succinctly states the pertinent facts as follows:
This case concerns a child [Noah] who was born out of wedlock in 1999 to
[MOM] Mazurek while she was in a relationship with [PAPER DAD]Powers, but [BIO DAD]Sinicropi is the
biological father of the child as established by DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid)
testing. Mazurek had dated Powers, then briefly dated Sinicropi, before
subsequently resuming her relationship with Powers, during which time the child
was born. [PAPER DAD]Powers, along with[MOM] Mazurek, executed an acknowledgment of
parentage on the child’s birth. None of the parties was aware that Sinicropi was
the biological father until 2004, when the DNA testing was conducted following
MOM ON ALERT GETS DNA TEST 2004
Mazurek’s suspicion that Sinicropi might be the father given the child’s
developing physical characteristics and appearance. Meanwhile, Powers raised
the child as his own with Mazurek.
[PAPER DAD]Powers and Mazurek again split up in 2001, and Powers filed a custody
action against Mazurek when the relationship ended.
PAPER DAD GETS A CONSENT ORDER 2001
They immediately stipulated the entry of a consent order giving them joint legal and physical
custody.
2004 PAPER DAD SEEKS CUSTODY MOM GETS DNA TEST TO STOP IT
In 2004, Powers sought sole custody after Mazurek moved out of
Jackson, Michigan, where Powers, Mazurek, and the child had resided since the
child’s birth, to live with her new fiancé in Shepherd, Michigan.
PAPER DAD GETS EX-PARTE ORDER
An ex parte order was entered granting Powers sole custody pending an evidentiary hearing.
MOM ASKS TO HAVE PAPER DADS , APER REVOKED
The trial court refused to dismiss Powers’s custody action and to revoke the
acknowledgment of parentage as requested by Mazurek on multiple occasions,
not because of a failure to show that Sinicropi was the biological father, but
because it would be inequitable and because res judicata and collateral estoppel
arising out of the consent order of joint custody would not allow it.
THE EX-PARTE BECOMES TEMPORARY
The trial court eventually converted the ex parte custody order into a
temporary order, scheduling a full evidentiary hearing on issues of custody and
parenting time.
PAPER DADA GETS TEMPORARY CUSTODY MOM GETS BIO DAD TO FILE PATERNITY SUIT TO OVER TURN IT
Thereafter, [BIO DAD]Sinicropi filed a paternity action under the Paternity
Act.
LOWER COURT SAYS THERE IS ANOTHER BIO DAD BUT DID NOT REVOKE PAPER DADS, PAPER
Subsequently, the trial court, after consolidating the paternity and custody
cases, entered an order of filiation that recognized Sinicropi as the child’s father,
yet the acknowledgment of parentage was not revoked.
THE MINOR CHILD IS NOW 5 YEARS OF AGE
At this stage in the proceedings, the young boy was five years old.
The trial court had rejected [PAPER]Powers’s argument that[BIO] Sinicropi lacked standing to file a paternity action, and it similarly rejected renewed efforts to have Powers’s custody action dismissed for lack of standing and to have the acknowledgement [sic] of parentage revoked.
THE TRIAL COURT SAID THE BABY HAS TWO DADDYS
The trial court effectively ruled that the child had two legal fathers under the
Acknowledgment of Parentage Act and the Paternity Act.
BEST INTEREST HEARING, PAPER DAD WINS GETS CUSTODY
Following a best-interests evidentiary hearing on custody, the trial court
awarded sole physical custody of the child to Powers, awarded Powers and
Mazurek joint legal custody, and awarded Mazurek parenting time. The trial
court reserved ruling on parenting time for [BIO] Sinicropi and on the issue of child
support.
POST JUDGEMENT UPPER SAID LOWER SHOULD TO MORE
In response to postjudgment motions filed by Mazurek and Sinicropi, the
trial court concluded that it should have conducted a best-interests analysis with
respect to Sinicropi and custody, but the court otherwise rejected Mazurek’s and
Sinicropi’s attack on the judgment.
LOWER DOES IT AGAIN AND BEST INTEREST ANALYSIS SAYS CHILD STAYS WITH PAPER DAD
The trial court reviewed the child custody factors and in a separate opinion decided that it would not be in the child’s best interests to award shared custody to Sinicropi.
MOM AND BIO DAD HAVE TO PAY CHILD SUPPORT TO PAPER DAD
Subsequently, [MOM]Mazurek and [BIO] Sinicropi were both ordered to pay child support. [Sinicropi, supra at 153-155.]
UPPER PROCEEDINGS
In the prior decision in this case, this Court held that the trial court erred by ruling that
Noah had two legally recognized fathers because an order of filiation in favor of Sinicropi could
not enter until the acknowledgment of Powers’s parentage had been revoked. Id. at 152.
This Court remanded the case to the trial court
for further reflection on the issue of revocation of the acknowledgment of
parentage.
The trial court is directed to address revocation solely under MCL
722.1011(3), which requires, in part, that[MOM] Mazurek prove by clear and convincing
evidence that revocation of the acknowledgment of parentage is proper
considering the equities of the case.
UPPER SAYS FIND ONLY ONE DADDY
Should the trial court again rule to reject revocation, the court shall pronounce [PAPER]Powers as the child’s legal father, vacate the order of filiation and any orders based thereon, including the child support orders relative to [BIO] Sinicropi, and let stand the custody determination as between Powers and Mazurek because we find no errors warranting reversal with respect to that
determination.
BUT UPPER SAYS IF YOU REVOKE THE PAPER THEN BIO IS THE DADDY
Should the trial court decide to revoke the acknowledgment of
parentage on remand, the court shall pronounce Sinicropi the child’s legal father
consistent with the order of filiation, vacate any orders based on Powers’s status
as the father, including the order granting him joint legal and sole physical
custody, and enter any appropriate orders, upon hearing if necessary, in regard to
custody and support as those matters relate to Sinicropi and Mazurek. [Id. at 185-
186.]
LOWER CONDUCTS A HEARING
The trial court commenced the evidentiary hearing on September 20, 2007, and continued
it on October 3, 2007. In support of Mazurek’s motion to revoke the acknowledgment of
paternity, she presented evidence that two of Powers’s former students consumed alcohol at his
home on at least one occasion, and that Noah had established a good relationship with
Sinicropi’s parents.1 Mazurek conceded, however, that Noah and Powers have "a significant and
long-enduring bond," and that the removal of Powers from the child’s life would not benefit
Noah.
BIO DAD SAYS HE WAS WITH THE CHILD FOUR TIMES, MOM WAS MANIPULATING
Sinicropi testified that he spent time with Noah on four occasions before the trial court
entered a no-contact order. According to Sinicropi, Noah "knew" that Sinicropi was his father.
1 Mazurek admitted that she permitted Noah to develop a relationship with Sinicropi’s parents
and his other family members despite the existence of an October 2005 court order prohibiting
contact between Sinicropi and the child.
BIO SAYS DNA SAYS I AM THE DADDY, DOES THAT MAKE HIM A FATHER, NO
In Sinicropi’s view, Noah’s best interests demanded the maintenance of a relationship with his
biological father "[b]ecause he knows about me, because he’s 8, and because it’s the right thing."
PAPER DAD GETS AN EXPERT, THE CHILD SEE PAPER AS DADDY AND IT WOULD HURT THE CHILD TO END IT
Powers presented the testimony of Dr. Janice Lazar, a psychologist who served as a
court-appointed expert pursuant to the parties’ stipulation. Dr. Lazar interviewed and evaluated
Mazurek, Sinicropi, Powers and Noah. She concluded that Noah had a strong bond with both
Mazurek and Powers, and opined that the termination of Noah’s relationship with Powers
"would be quite harmful to that child." Dr. Lazar explained,
Noah has been raised believing that Martin is his father in every sense of
the word. To remove Martin from his life would be the same as removing any
child’s parent that they are strongly bonded and attached to. That would be
extremely harmful to any child.
BIO DADA IS JUST HELPER DAD
According to Dr. Lazar, Noah referred to Sinicropi as a "helper dad," and was unsure of
Sinicropi’s actual status. Dr. Lazar opined that the removal of Sinicropi from Noah’s life would
not harm Noah.
LOWER WILL NOT LET CHILD LOSE THE ONLY REAL FATHER HE HAS KNOWN
In its bench opinion, the trial court observed that if it granted Mazurek’s motion, "Noah
would lose the only father he’s ever known, and I don’t think that that represents the proper
balancing of the equities in the case." Relying primarily on Dr. Lazar’s testimony, the court
denied Mazurek’s request to revoke the acknowledgment of parentage, finding that Noah would
endure harm by either the termination of his relationship with Powers or the introduction of
another father. Mazurek and Sinicropi now appeal that decision.
II. Issues Presented and Analysis
Mazurek and Sinicropi raise identical issues on appeal. Initially, they contend that the
trial court clearly erred when it balanced the equities against revocation of the acknowledgment
of parentage. According to both briefs on appeal, "the equities show that Noah has an ongoing
relationship with Mr. Sinicropi, his biological father and his extended family. In contrast, Mr.
Powers has demonstrated particularly poor judgment (at best) which has a direct impact on his
ability to act as a responsible parent to Noah."
When reviewing a dispositional ruling in an equitable matter, "an appellate court will set
aside a trial court’s factual findings only if they are clearly erroneous, but whether equitable
relief is proper under those facts is a question of law that an appellate court reviews de novo."
McDonald v Farm Bureau Ins Co, 480 Mich 191, 197; 747 NW2d 811 (2008). Clear error exists
when some evidence supports a finding, but a review of the entire record leaves the reviewing
court with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. In re Conley, 216
Mich App 41, 42; 549 NW2d 353 (1996).
This Court previously directed that the sole issue to be determined on remand was
whether pursuant to MCL 722.1011(3), clear and convincing evidence of "the equities of the
case" supported revocation of Mazurek’s acknowledgment of Powers’s parentage. The record
reveals that throughout the eight years of Noah’s life, he knew no father besides Powers. Indeed,
the trial court awarded Powers sole physical custody of Noah in September 2005, finding that
Powers had "shown an enormous [parenting] capacity for a single man" and consistently "put
Noah first." In contrast, Noah had only a short-lived, peripheral relationship with Sinicropi,
despite some possible awareness that Sinicropi was his biological father.2
Dr. Lazar observed that Noah presented as a happy and "extremely enthusiastic" child,
and that he expressed an inability to think of "anything that he would change in his life at this
time." The evidence demonstrated that Noah enjoyed a strong and positive bond with both
Powers and Mazurek, performed well in school, and, in the words of Dr. Lazar, seemed "an
extremely engaging, happy and contented child who enjoys a strong relationship with all of the
adults in his life, particularly his mother, Holly Mazurak [sic], and the man he is bonded to as his
father, Martin Powers."
Mazurek and Sinicropi argue that the trial court erred by failing to place stronger
emphasis on the testimony that several minors consumed alcohol while visiting Powers. Because
this appears to have been an isolated event that may have reflected poor judgment in limited
circumstances, in our view it does not constitute evidence that Powers either qualifies as unsuited
or unfit to parent Noah. Mazurek and Sinicropi additionally contend that the trial court relied
exclusively on the testimony of Dr. Lazar, and thereby "abdicated" its role as the finder of fact.
This argument ignores the trial court’s considerable knowledge regarding the dynamics of
Noah’s custodial environment, acquired during the proceedings that occurred in 2005 and
intensified in 2006. At the conclusion of the October 2007 hearing, the trial court expressed its
heartfelt sympathy and respect for Sinicropi, and specifically referenced its previous findings
under the "best interest" factors.
CHILD WAS INTRODUCED TO THE PARENTS OF BIO DAD
Furthermore, the trial court afforded Mazurek and Sinicropi a virtually limitless
opportunity to present evidence regarding any issue relevant to the equities of revocation.
Mazurek and Sinicropi took full advantage of that opportunity by offering evidence including the
observations of a private detective after his investigation of Powers, and testimony from
Sinicropi’s mother describing Noah’s relationship with his biological grandparents and other
members of the Sinicropi family. We find no clear error in the trial court’s conclusion that
Mazurek and Sinicropi failed to present clear and convincing evidence supporting revocation of
the acknowledgment of parentage.
PAPER NO EQUITABLE FATHER HE IS REAL FATHER BECAUSE OF PAPER
Mazurek and Sinicropi also argue that the trial court’s decision conflicts with Van v
Zahorik, 460 Mich 320; 597 NW2d 15 (1999), because it "essentially makes Mr. Powers an
‘equitable father.’" As this Court previously explained, however, Van "is not implicated here
because, in contrast to the factual circumstances in Van, Powers executed an acknowledgment of
parentage," and at that point "is . . . deemed the natural and legal father" of Noah, and not an
equitable parent. Sinicropi, supra at 162. Further, this Court’s determination that Van does
govern here constitutes the law of the case. Under the law of the case doctrine, "if an appellate
court has passed on a legal question and remanded the case for further proceedings, the legal
questions thus determined by the appellate court will not be differently determined on a
2 In her written report admitted as an exhibit during the evidentiary hearing, Dr. Lazar stated,
"Noah does not appear to have knowledge of the issue of paternity in this case. Furthermore, I
do not believe he understands or has knowledge of the biological issue involved."
subsequent appeal in the same case where the facts remain materially the same." CAF
Investment Co v Saginaw Twp, 410 Mich 428, 454; 302 NW2d 164 (1981).
IF PATERNITY ACKNOWLEDGE [PAPER] NO ORDER OF FILIATION CAN BE ENTERED
Mazurek and Sinicropi next assert that the trial court erred by refusing to enter an order
of filiation under MCL 722.717(1). However, this Court considered and decided that issue in
Sinicropi, holding that "an order of filiation cannot be entered under the Paternity Act, MCL
722.711 et seq., if, under the Acknowledgment of Parentage Act, MCL 722.1001 et seq., a
proper acknowledgment of parentage was previously executed and has not been revoked." Id. at
152. Again, the law of the case doctrine prohibits reconsideration of this issue because there has
been no intervening change in the law.
THE UPPER CHANGES THE LAW IN MICHIGAN?
The law of the case doctrine holds that a ruling by an appellate court on a
particular issue binds the appellate court and all lower tribunals with respect to
that issue. Thus, a question of law decided by an appellate court will not be
decided differently on remand or in a subsequent appeal in the same case. . . .
However, the doctrine does not preclude reconsideration of a question if there has
been an intervening change of law. [Ashker v Ford Motor Co, 245 Mich App 9,
13; 627 NW2d 1 (2001).]
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS
Finally, Mazurek and Sinicropi argue that the trial court should have taken into account
the "Constitutional considerations in this case [that] go directly to the issue of [the] equities."
Initially, we observe that in Sinicropi, we addressed essentially the same constitutional issues as
those now raised on appeal. Id. at 168-171. Because the law of the case doctrine governs the
outcome of these constitutional questions, as well, we decline to revisit that constitutional
analysis here. See also MCR 7.215(J)(1).
WHAT ARE EQUITIES?
During oral argument, appellants’ counsel contended that the absence of standards or
guidelines defining "the equities" a trial court should apply when considering the potential
revocation of an acknowledgment of parentage violated Mazurek’s and Sinicropi’s due process
rights. We reject this argument for several reasons.
First, although neither case law nor the
statute defines "the equities" as that term appears in MCL 722.1011(3), the equitable functions of
a court are well-established in our jurisprudence. For example, MCL 600.601 "contains a broad
grant of all equity powers traditionally exercised in chancery to the circuit courts." Lester v
Spreen, 84 Mich App 689, 695; 270 NW2d 493 (1978). Trial courts are accustomed to
fashioning equitable resolutions because "[i]t is the historic function of equity to give such relief
as justice and good conscience require." Levant v Kowal, 350 Mich 232, 241; 86 NW2d 336
(1957). Here, the trial court drew on virtually all of the traditional equitable principles
applicable in family law cases: the best interests of the child, the fitness of the competing
parents, and the past relationships of the parties.
Additionally, the trial court entertained testimony from Sinicropi concerning Noah’s interest in and awareness of his genetic heritage, and expert opinion regarding the existing emotional bonds and family dynamics.

In our view highly ,charged and intimate circumstances such as these require the flexibility and practicality of
a traditional equitable approach. Equity aims to "do complete justice by embracing the whole
subject, deciding upon and settling the rights of all persons interested in the subject-matter, to
make performance of the orders perfectly safe to those who have to obey it, and to prevent
further litigation." Ladas v Psiharis, 241 Mich 101, 106; 216 NW 458 (1927). Had the
Legislature intended to impose a rigid template on this decision-making process, it would have
done so. Sparks v Sparks, 440 Mich 141, 158-159; 485 NW2d 893 (1992).
THIS IS NOT A TERMINATION OF THE BIO DADS PARENTAL RIGHTS
Lastly, we observe that this case is not equivalent to a termination of parental rights
proceeding, in which the state must establish by at least clear and convincing evidence
constitutionally sufficient grounds for termination before it may sever parental rights. Santosky v
Kramer, 455 US 745, 768-770; 102 S Ct 1388; 71 L Ed 2d 599 (1982). The due process
principles discussed in Santosky derive from the liberty interests inherent in a parent’s already
established custodial relationship with a child. The United States Supreme Court has specifically
rejected the notion that biological parenthood standing alone, or even in conjunction with some
additional relationship, suffices to establish a liberty interest. Michael H v Gerald D, 491 US
110, 123; 109 S Ct 2333; 105 L Ed 2d 91 (1989). Because Sinicropi’s relationship to Noah is
biological, rather than parental, and otherwise wholly undeveloped, he has no constitutionally
protected rights in the substance or procedures of the hearing conducted pursuant to MCL
722.1011(3).
Affirmed.[UPPER UP HELD LOWER- PAPER IS FATHER]
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher