Showing posts with label FLINT DIVORCE ATTORNEY. Show all posts
Showing posts with label FLINT DIVORCE ATTORNEY. Show all posts

Thursday, June 21, 2012

DIVORCE AND IRA DISTRIBUTION






FYI-Flint Divorce Bankruptcy Attorney Terry R. Bankert 235-1970, www.attorneybankert.com  asks DID YOU KNOW?.From Creative Tax and Financial Tips for the Low Asset/Underwater Case By Mary V. Ade, Stout Risius Ross, Southfieldningham JD CPA PC Troy


Accessing Funds in IRAs
The penalty exemption afforded to qualified plans does not apply to IRAs. However, do not overlook the possibility of tapping into IRAs.
  1. Exceptions to 10% Penalty RuleGenerally, if you are under age 59 1/2, you must pay a 10% additional tax on the distribution of any assets (money or other property) from your traditional IRA. Distributions before you are age 59 1/2 are called early distributions. The 10% additional tax applies to the part of the distribution that you have to include in gross income. It is in addition to any regular income tax on that amount.The following exceptions to the age 59 1/2 rule may be particularly relevant in a divorce context. Even if you receive a distribution before you are age 59 1/2, you may not have to pay the 10% additional tax if you are in one of the following situations.
    • You are receiving distributions in the form of an annuity.
    • The distributions are not more than your qualified higher education expenses.
    • Your unreimbursed medical expenses are more than 7.5% of your AGI.
    • The distributions are not more than the cost of your medical insurance.

Friday, April 08, 2011

FLINT DIVORCE ATTORNEY,FLINT DIVORCE LAWYER POST ON PROPERTY SETTLEMENT, Terry R. Bankert 810-235-1970


FLINT DIVORCE ATTORNEY,FLINT DIVORCE LAWYER POST ON PROPERTY SETTLEMENT, Terry R. Bankert 810-235-1970



MOM GETS PRIMARY PHYSICAL CUSTODY?



The APPELLATE court held that the DIVORCE trial court did not err in its division of the parties' real and personal property and its award of primary physical custody of the parties' child to the plaintiff-wife.



Issues PRESENTED HERE:

A.Divorce;

B.The trial court's findings of fact; McDougal v. McDougal; Draggoo v. Draggoo; Holmes v. Holmes;

C.Binding effect of property settlements reached through negotiations and agreement by the parties; Keyser v. Keyser;

D.Abandoned issue; MCR 7.212(C)(7); McIntosh v. McIntosh; Custody; Berger v. Berger; Stipulation; Dick v. Dick

__________________________________________/

SOURCE Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ,Case Name: TXXXXX v. TXXXXX,e-Journal Number: 48366,Judge(s): Per Curiam – Gleicher, Whitbeck, and Owens UNPUBLISHED March 15, 2011, No. 296949,Allegan Circuit Court, LC No. 07-042486-DM.

__________________________________________/



HUSBAND TELLS THE COURT YHEY DID NOT DO IT RIGHT



The defendant-husband challenged the trial court's disposition of the parties' personal and real property, arguing, inter alia, that the trial court failed to find and take into account when disposing of the martial property that plaintiff did not maintain the status quo and the trial court erred in giving plaintiff the property adjacent to the marital residence.

________________________________________/

This article posted by Flint Divorce Attorney Terry R. Bankert 810-235-1970. Article has been modified and written in SEO format. Posters comments in CAP or cited [trb]. Questions contact http://www.attorneybankert.com/


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DIVIDED PROPERTY SHOULD BE EQUAL!

He also contended that the trial court's division of marital personal property was not equal, and the trial court's disposition of the parties' personal property was erroneous because plaintiff's personal property appraisal was improper.

IT WAS AN AGREEMENT?

However, the parties stipulated on the record that they had reached a settlement regarding the division of their real and personal property.

PARTIES EACH HAD DIVORCE ATTORNEYS

Defendant was represented by counsel and indicated that he understood and agreed to the settlement.

DIVORCE COURT JUDGE INCORPORATRED THEIR AGREEMENT?

The trial court's judgment of divorce was consistent with the parties' agreement. Defendant did not allege, and the record did not indicate, the presence of fraud, duress, mutual mistake, or severe stress.

YOU CANNOT HAVE YOUR CAKE AND EAT IT TOO!

He could not stipulate to the division of property and now argue to the court that the ensuing property disposition was erroneous.



THE MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS SAID



“A party may not take a position in the trial court and subsequently seek redress in an

appellate court that is based on a position contrary to that taken in the trial court.” Holmes v Holmes, 281 Mich App 575, 587-588; 760 NW2d 300 (2008). Moreover, “[a] party cannot stipulate a matter and then argue on appeal that the resultant action was error.” Id. at 588. “[C]ourts are bound by property settlements reached through negotiations and agreement by parties to a divorce action, in the absence of fraud, duress, mutual mistake, or severe stress which prevented a party from understanding in a reasonable manner the nature and effect of the act in which she was engaged.” Keyser v Keyser, 182 Mich App 268, 269-270; 451 NW2d 587 (1990). “This rule applies whether the settlement is in writing . . . or . . . orally placed on the record and consented to by the parties, even though not yet formally entered as part of the divorce judgment by the lower court.” Id. at 270.



HUSBAND LOSES ARGUMENT

Affirmed.

-----END

If you have questions about divorce please contact Terry R. Bankert http://www.attorneybankert.com/

Tuesday, March 22, 2011

FLINT DIVORCE ATTORNEY AND CASE WHERE WIFE GETS MORE PROPERTY

Flint Divorce Attorney Terry Bankert ,810-235-1970 discusses several Issues: 1.Divorce;


2.The defendant-husband's claim that the property division was inequitable; Pickering v. Pickering; Reed v. Reed;

3.The factors in Sparks v. Sparks; Berger v. Berger; Thames v. Thames;

4Infidelity; Davey v. Davey;

4Dissipation of martial assets; Woodington v. Shokoohi



SOURCE:Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished 02/15/2011),

Case Name: S----- v. S-----, Livingston Circuit Court, LC No. 08-003892-DO

e-Journal Number: 48129,Judge(s): Per Curiam - Murphy, Murray, and Shapiro,

[Comments of Flint Divorce Lawyer Terry Bankert ALL CAPS or trb]



YOU HAVE A RIGHT TO APPEAL THE DECISION OF YOUR LOCAL DIVORCE COURT



A trial court’s factual findings will not be reversed unless they are found

to be clearly erroneous, meaning that, this Court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Reed v Reed, 265 Mich App 131, 150; 693 NW2d 825 (2005).



GOOD LUCK IF YOU TRY

A trial court’s dispositional ruling should be affirmed unless this Court is left with the firm conviction that the property division was inequitable. Pickering, 268 Mich App at 7.



HIGH COURT DECISION



The Michigan Court of Appeals held, inter alia, that an unequal division of marital property is not contrary to Michigan law as long as it is based on the appropriate criteria, the trial court properly determined the situation (after a 38-year marriage) did not warrant a 50-50 property division based on the property division factors, and the trial court did not err in awarding the plaintiff-wife $150,000 in alimony in gross.

The LIVINGSTON DIVORCE trial court used its equitable powers to mold relief according to the nature of the case and did what was necessary to accord complete equity and to resolve the controversy. The MICHGIAN COURT OF APPEALS concluded that reversal was not warranted as to the division of property.

HOW DOES A COURT MAKE A PROPERTY DIVISION?

In dividing the marital property, the trial court’s opinion here addressed the property division

factors set forth in Sparks v Sparks, 440 Mich 141, 159-160; 485 NW2d 893 (1992).

The Sparks Court stated:

We hold that the following factors are to be considered wherever they are

relevant to the circumstances of the particular case: (1) duration of the marriage,

(2) contributions of the parties to the marital estate, (3) age of the parties, (4)

health of the parties, (5) life status of the parties, (6) necessities and circumstances

of the parties, (7) earning abilities of the parties, (8) past relations and conduct of

the parties, and (9) general principles of equity. There may even be additional

factors that are relevant to a particular case. For example, the court may choose to

consider the interruption of the personal career or education of either party. The

determination of relevant factors will vary depending on the facts and

circumstances of the case. [Id. (citation omitted).]



HUSBANDS ARGUMENT-WIFE CAN WORK!

On appeal the defendant-husband argued the trial court made factual findings that were unsupported by the record - particularly that the wife might be unable to work in the future due to poor health,

HUSBAND ARGUES WIFE EQUALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR BAD INVESTMENTS

the defendant should bear the sole responsibility for bad marital investments and (indirectly) the balance on the equity line of credit,

HUSBANDS ARGUMENT- INFIDELITY NOT A BIG DEAL

and the LIVINGSTON DIVORCE trial court placed an inordinate amount of weight on his infidelity in dividing the martial assets.



…defendant complains that the trial court placed an inordinate amount of emphasis

on his affair and ordered an inequitable property distribution to punish him. A circumstance "to be considered in the determination of property division is the fault or misconduct of a party." Davey v Davey, 106 Mich App 579, 581-582; 308 NW2d 468 (1981). However, “the trial court must consider all the relevant factors and not assign disproportionate weight to any one circumstance.” Sparks, 440 Mich at 158.

HUSBAND CONTINUED AFFAIR WHILE IN COUNSELING WITH WIFE

The trial court found defendant’s affair to be significant in relationship to assessing defendant’s credibility. It is undisputed that defendant lied to plaintiff

about the existence of the affair, misled her about the termination of the affair, and participated in counseling with plaintiff while still engaging in the affair.

WIFE GETS $150,000

The court noted that the disparity in the property division was essentially created by the award to the wife of $150,000 in alimony in gross, given that the trial court otherwise evenly divided, for the most part, the marital estate.

DID YOU KNOW?

Woodington v Shokoohi, 288 Mich App 352; __ NW2d __ (2010) (when a party has dissipated marital assets absent the fault of the other spouse, the value of the dissipated assets can be included in the marital estate).



WHAT IS ALIMONY IN GROSS

If alimony, now referred to as spousal support, is either a lump sum or a definite sum to be paid in installments, it is alimony in gross, which is not truly alimony intended for a spouse’s maintenance, but rather is in the nature of a division of property. Staple v Staple, 241 Mich App 562, 580; 616 NW2d 219 (2000).

NO VALUE IN MARITAL HOME

There was no equity and was indeed negative equity in the marital home awarded to the wife, where its appraised value was surpassed by the mortgage and the balance on the home equity line of credit, which the trial court ordered the wife to pay.

ALIMONY TO PAY OFF LINE OF CREDIT

It appeared from the record that the trial court ordered the husband to pay alimony in gross so that plaintiff could use the funds to pay off the balance due on the line of credit, which nearly equaled the amount of alimony.

LIVINGSTON COUNTY DIVORCE COURT GOT IT RIGHT

On the record presented at trial, and given all of the circumstances in the case, there was no inequity in the trial court's decision. Affirmed.

DIVORCE PROPERTY DIVISION CAN BE UNEQUAL

An unequal division of marital property is not contrary to Michigan law as long as it is

based on appropriate criteria. Washington v Washington, 283 Mich App 667, 673; 770 NW2d 908 (2009). Here, the property division favored plaintiff; however, the trial court assessed the relevant factors, and the record supported such findings. Moreover, "there is no Michigan statute or caselaw that precludes outright a substantial deviation from numerical equality in a property distribution award." Id. In this case, the trial determined that the situation did not warrant a 50- 50 property division based upon the property division factors. The trial court did not err in awarding plaintiff $150,000 in alimony in gross. The trial court used its equitable powers to mold relief according to the nature of the case and it did what was necessary to accord complete equity and to conclude the controversy. Cohen v Cohen, 125 Mich App 206, 211; 335 NW2d 661 (1983).



If you have question about Divorce, custody , child support or bankruptcy call Flint Attorney Terry Bankert 1-810-235-1970

http://www.attorneybankert.com/


Sunday, November 14, 2010

Division of Marital Property

Statutory Authority


Did you know Divorce law is based on statutes. There is no authority to divide property, for example, absent an applicable statute. Charlton v Charlton, 397 Mich 84; 243 NW2d 261 (1976). Here we will look at what the statute says.

Terry Ray Bankert is a Michigan Attorney specializing in Family Law, and works as a Flint Divorce Attorney, Flint Divorce lawyer, Genesee Divorce Lawyer and Genesee Divorce Attorney.(SEO) For help with your questions call 810-235-1970. Or


The primary statutory authority for a court to award property in a divorce case is MCL 552.19:

When there is an  annulment of a marriage, a divorce  or a judgment of separate maintenance, the court may make a further judgment for restoring to either party the whole, or such parts as it finds  just and reasonable, of the real and personal estate that shall have come to either party by reason of the marriage, or for awarding to either party the value thereof, to be paid by either party in money.
The statute is hard to read and apply  and he courts have defined  the marital estate. The process has been slow and evolving, and even now there is no legal or simple definition of the marital estate.
III. WHAT IS  Marital Property



 Reeves v Reeves, 226 Mich App 490; 575 NW2d 1 (1997), lv den 459 Mich 882; 586 NW2d 746 (1998), is the law in Michigan. The DOCTRINE of Reeves was approved by the Michigan Supreme Court in Dart v Dart, 460 Mich 573, 585 n 6; 597 NW2d 82 (1999).

This case says:
The distribution of property in a divorce is controlled by statute. MCL 552.1 et seq. (subsequent citations omitted). In granting a divorce, the court may divide all property that came “to either party by reason of the marriage….” MCL 552.19 ….Reeves at 493. [Emphasis in original.]


The Reeves  case emphasizes that the assets to be divided in a divorce case are those which occurred during the marriage:

When apportioning marital property, the court must strive for an equitable division of increases in marital assets “that may have occurred between the beginning and the end of the marriage.” Bone v Bone, 148 Mich App 834, 838; 385 NW2d 706 (1986). Id at 493. [Emphasis in original.]

YOUR DIVORCE ATTORNEY MUST ARGUE THE SEPARATE AND JOINT PROPERTY
Reeves then repeated the proposition found in Byington v Byington, 224 Mich App 103, 114, n 4; 568 NW2d 141 (1997):
Your divorce Judge has the initial obligation  when dividing property in divorce proceedings to determine marital and separate assets. Id at 493–494.


Terry Ray Bankert is a Michigan Attorney specializing in Family Law, and works as a Flint Divorce Attorney, Flint Divorce lawyer, Genesee Divorce Lawyer and Genesee Divorce Attorney.(SEO) For help with your questions call 810-235-1970. Or



Reeves then sets forth the construct for the division of property in a divorce:



Generally, the marital estate is divided between the parties, and each party takes away from the marriage that party’s own separate estate with no invasion by the other party. However, a spouse’s separate estate can be opened for redistribution when one of two statutorily created exceptions is met. MCL 552.23 and 552.401 (additional citations omitted).





Finally, Reeves sets forth the order for the analysis:



After properly recognizing the parties’ separate estates and the marital estate, the court may consider whether invasion of defendant’s estate is necessary. Before the court may invade defendant’s separate estate, it must specifically find that one of the two statutory exceptions exists. Id at 497–498.





Despite the analysis in this critically important case, the questions of what is “property”, and from that, what is “marital property” are still left unanswered. There is no statute, court rule, or case law which expressly defines “marital property”. Ultimately, what is “property” is limited only by the creativity of the matrimonial lawyer, and what is “marital property” is anything which is not “separate property”.



Recently, in Cunningham v Cunningham, ___ Mich App ___, ___ NW2d ___ (Docket No. 285541, decided 7/13/10), the Court of Appeals noted the difficulty in applying Reeves to distinguish between separate and marital property:



The categorization of property as marital or separate, however, is not always easily achieved. While income earned by one spouse during the duration of the marriage is generally presumed to be marital property, Byington [v Byington, 224 Mich App 103 568 NW2d 141 (1997)], 224 Mich App at 112, there are occasions where property earned or acquired during the marriage may be deemed separate property. For example, an inheritance received by one spouse during the marriage and kept separate from marital property is separate property. Dart v Dart, 460 Mich 573, 584–585; 597 NW2d 82 (1999). Similarly, proceeds received by one spouse in a personal injury lawsuit meant to compensate for pain and suffering, as opposed to lost wages, is generally considered separate property. Washington v Washington, 283 Mich App 667, 674; 770 NW2d 908 (2009); Pickering [v Pickering, 268 Mich App 1, 706 NW2d 835 (2005)], 268 Mich App at 10. Moreover, separate assets may lose their character as separate property and transform into marital property if they are commingled with marital assets and “treated by the parties as marital property.” Pickering, 268 Mich App at 12–13, citing Wilson v Wilson, 179 Mich App 519, 521, 524; 446 NW2d 496 (1989). The mere fact that property may be held jointly or individually is not necessarily dispositive of whether the property is classified as separate or marital. See Korth v Korth, 256 Mich App 286, 292; 662 NW2d 111 (2003); Reeves, 226 Mich App at 492, 495–496.





The Cunningham panel held that the husband’s worker’s compensation benefits received during the marriage for an injury prior to the marriage were nonetheless marital property because they represented a replacement of wages that would have been earned during the marriage. The panel noted some confusion as to whether a lump sum award received after years of litigation was a settlement of the pre-marriage claim via redemption (which logically would be the husband’s separate property) or rather was merely retroactive benefits, i.e. replacement wages, for earnings that would have occurred at least partially during the marriage (a portion of which would be marital property).



http://www.attorneybankert.com . Principle Source ICLE 09/16/10
http://www.attorneybankert.com . Principle Source ICLE 09/16/10

Tuesday, June 15, 2010

FLINT DIVORCE ATTORNEY POST ST. CLAIR COUNTY DIVORCE JUDGEMENT AND THE HIGHER COURTS REVIEW

 Judgement language, St.Clair County Divorce, Flint lawyer, Step Mom and insurance proceeds, who get what?




WHY DID A ST.CLAIR COUNTY DIVORCE DECISION GOE TO SUPREME COURT, These Issues presented by Flint Divorce ATTORNEY Terry Bankert 235-1979:

1.INSURANCE COMPANY DISTRIBUTIONClaims related to the erroneous payment of insurance proceeds to defendant-Cindy Genaw;

2,AMBIGUITY Interpretation of MCL 552.101(2); Houdek v. Centerville Twp.; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Church; Notice; Schepke v. Department of Natural Res.; Thom v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co.; ERISA; Sweebe v. Sweebe; Moore v. Moore



MICHGIAN St. Clair Divorce insurance issue to be reviewed by the Michigan Supreme Court Order in its order of ,June 4, 2010. For reference Supreme Court #SC: 140017, Michigan Court of Appeals #COA: 284214



The case is based on a  MICHIGAN St, Clair Divorce decision litigated in St Clair Probate Court : 07-000069-CZ



Case Name: Genaw v. Genaw ,GAYLORD GENAW, JR., Personal Representative of the Estate of Gaylord Genaw, Sr., Plaintiff-Appellee, v CINDY GENAW, Defendant,and

UNUM LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant. e-Journal Number: 46010

Judge(s): Cavanagh, Weaver, Corrigan, Young, Jr., and Markman; Dissent - Kelly; Voting to deny leave to appeal - Hathaway. Additions for lay understanding and SEO noted as CAP headlines or [trb]

THE MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT SAYS THE MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS MAY HAVE GOT IT WRONG

In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals in a published opinion for the reasons stated in the Court of Appeals dissenting opinion, and remanded to the probate court for entry of an order granting defendant-Unum's motion for summary disposition.

AGAIN INSURANCE COMPANY OFF THE HOOK!

The defendant-insurer was discharged from all liability under MCL 552.101(2) when it paid the policy benefits to the named beneficiary prior to receiving any notice of a competing or adverse claim to those benefits.

RIGHTFULLY JUSTICE KELLY DOES NOT AGREE

In her dissent, Justice Kelly would grant leave to appeal to resolve the differing interpretations of MCL 552.101(2), which addresses entitlement to life insurance proceeds after a divorce.

BEWARE UNLESS YOUR DIVORCE JUDGEMENT SAYS OTHERWISE INSURANCE PROCEEDS WILL GO TO INSURED.

The statute declares, "absent an express designation to the contrary, once a divorce is final all policy benefits are payable to the insured."

WHAT HAPPENS WHEN EX SPOUSE LEFT OFF AFTER DIVORCE

This addresses the problems posed when an ex-spouse is inadvertently left as the named beneficiary after a divorce. Another clause protects insurance carriers. It provides a carrier is discharged from liability for distribution of the insurance proceeds if it pays them to the named beneficiary, absent notice of a competing claim.

THE HIGHER COURT’S JOB IS TO CLARIFY THE LAW

The Supreme Court should resolve the correct interpretation of MCL 552.101(2). The majority "hastily accepted the dissenting opinion as correct" without full briefing or oral argument.

THE EX WIFE IS A PERSON OF INTEREST

Under the language of the statute, petitioner's ex-wife, a named beneficiary of the policy, appeared to be a "person having interest in the policy." The statute does not contain a requirement the notice be given by someone other than the named beneficiary or the insurer be advised of a competing claim to the insurance benefits.

SUPREME COURT REVERSES THE COURT OF APPEALS

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the October 6, 2009

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.302(H)(1), in

lieu of granting leave to appeal, we REVERSE the judgment of the Court of Appeals



THE SUPREME COURT AGREES WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS DISSENTBY C.J.KELLY



for the reasons stated in the Court of Appeals dissenting opinion, and REMAND this case to

the St. Clair Probate Court for entry of an order granting defendant Unum Life Insurance

Company’s motion for summary disposition.

INSURANCE COMPANY OFF THE HOOK

The defendant insurer was discharged from all liability under MCL 552.101(2) when it paid the policy benefits to the named beneficiary prior to receiving any notice of a competing or adverse claim to those
benefits.

KELLY, C.J. (dissenting).



I would grant leave to appeal.

WHAT HAPPENS TO INSURANCE IN A MICHIGAN DIVORCE

At issue in this case is the interpretation of MCL 552.101(2), a statute that addresses entitlement to life insurance proceeds after a divorce.

THE LAW IS CLEAR SO WHAT IS THE PROBLEM

The statute declares that, absent an express designation to the contrary, once a divorce is

final all policy benefits are payable to the insured.

WHAT IF THE DIVORCE COURT ORDER WAS FOR THE SURVIVING SPOUSE NOT TO GET BENEFITS? BUT A MICHGIAN DIVORCE ATTORNEY MAKES A MISTAKE AND THE INSURANCE BENIFICIARY WAS NOT CHANGED? WAS IT THE MICHIGAN DIVORCE LAWYERS FAULT?



This addresses the problems posed when an ex-spouse is inadvertently left as the named beneficiary after a divorce.

MISTAKE OR NO MISTAKE BIG BUSINESS IS OFF THE HOOK

An additional clause protects insurance carriers. It provides that a carrier is discharged from

liability for distribution of the insurance proceeds if it pays them to the named

beneficiary, absent notice of a competing claim.1

GETTING TO THE POINT



The issue in this case is whether notice was provided to the insurance company.

Gaylord Genaw, Sr. was killed in a traffic accident just three days after he was divorced

from his wife.

THE ST.CLAIR COUNTY DIVORCE JUDGEMENT SAID WIFE NOT ENTITLED

The judgment expressly indicated that his ex-wife was not entitled to the

proceeds of his life insurance policy.

IT APPEARS THE ST. CLAIR COUNTY DIVORCE LAWYER DID NOT NOTIFY THE INSURANCE COMPANY OF WIFE’S DISENTITLEMENT!



However, his ex-wife’s designation as beneficiary on the policy was never changed. She took advantage of this after the accident and made a claim for the proceeds.



AT HUSBANDS DEATH WIFE TOLD THEM ABOUT THE DIVORCE, THEY NEVER READ IT AND PAID HER ANYWAY. WHY IS BIG ISURANCE LET OFF THE HOOK AGAIN?



Defendant paid them to her, even though she disclosed the divorce on the claim form and the death certificate she submitted to defendant also indicated that Gaylord was divorced.



STEP SON IN A LOVING THOUGHTFUL MANNER SUES HIS EX STEP MOTHER



When Gaylord’s son discovered that she had improperly collected the policy proceeds, he brought this action against her and against the insurance company.



ST.CLAIR COUNTY PROBATE COURT SAYS STEP MOM GIVE IT UP!

The trial court ordered the ex-wife to turn over to plaintiff what remained of the

proceeds. The court then held defendant liable for the remainder.



THE MICHGIAN COURT OF APPEALS ALSO SAID STEP MOM KEEP THE MONEY!

The Court of Appeals affirmed this action in a published split opinion.2 It found that the ex-wife qualified

As “any other person having interest in the policy” under MCL 552.101(2).

SHE TOLD THE INSURANCE COMPANY THERE WAS A DIVORCE, WHY NOT KEEP THE MONEY?



Because she Had given defendant written notice of the divorce, the court found that defendant had received

notice according to the statute and was therefore responsible for wrongfully disbursing

1

ST.CLAIR COUNTY, MICHIGAN, DIVORCE AND INSURANCE

MCL 552.101(2) states, in its entirety:

Each judgment of divorce or judgment of separate maintenance shall

determine all rights of the wife in and to the proceeds of any policy or

contract of life insurance, endowment, or annuity upon the life of the

husband in which the wife was named or designated as beneficiary, or to

which the wife became entitled by assignment or change of beneficiary

during the marriage or in anticipation of marriage. If the judgment of

divorce or judgment of separate maintenance does not determine the rights

of the wife in and to a policy of life insurance, endowment, or annuity, the

policy shall be payable to the estate of the husband or to the named

beneficiary if the husband so designates. However, the company issuing

the policy shall be discharged of all liability on the policy by payment of its

proceeds in accordance with the terms of the policy unless before the

payment the company receives written notice, by or on behalf of the insured

or the estate of the insured, 1 of the heirs of the insured, or any other

person having an interest in the policy, of a claim under the policy and the

divorce. [Emphasis added.]



2 In re Genaw Estate, 285 Mich App 660 (2009).

3

the funds.3 The dissenting judge would have held that a named beneficiary cannot

qualify as an “other person having interest in the policy.”4



WHAT IS THE CORRECT INTERPRETATION? WHAT IT SAYS OR WHAT IT MEANS J



The Supreme Court should resolve the correct interpretation of MCL 552.101(2).



THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS IN A SLOPPY HURRY?

The majority has hastily accepted the dissenting opinion as correct without the benefit of

full briefing or oral argument.

ONE SUPREME COURT JUSTICE IS TROUBLED!

I find this troublesome because, under the language of the statute, petitioner’s ex-wife, a named beneficiary of the policy, appears to be a “person having interest in the policy.”

JUST WHAT KIND OF NOTICE IS ADEQUATE

Nowhere does the statute contain a requirement that notice be given by someone other than the named beneficiary or that the insurer be advised of a competing claim to the insurance benefits.

THEY NEED PERMISSION OF LEAVE TO APPEAL, IT WAS GIVEN.

Accordingly, I would grant leave to appeal to resolve the differing interpretations

of the statute.



3 Under the factual circumstances of this case, it is undisputed that Unum received a

claim from Genaw that specifically acknowledged both her status as the ex-wife of the

decedent and the existence of a divorce. Consequently, this information, submitted in

conjunction with her claim, was sufficient to meet the notice requirement imposed by the

existing statutory language, and the insurance company was not absolved of its liability

for payment of the proceeds to the designated beneficiary. [Id. at 669.]

PLAIN LANGUAGE

4 [T]he plain language of the statute absolves an insurer of liability for paying its

proceeds in accordance with the terms of the policy unless before the payment it receives

written notice of a claim and of the divorce from one of the persons identified in the

statute.

SPECIFIED PERSONS

These specified persons—(1) the insured or the estate of the insured, (2) the heirs

of the insured, or (3) any other person having an interest in the policy—are plainly ones

who could have an interest in the policy if the beneficiary designated in the policy no

longer had a right to the benefits of the policy.

CLAIM MAKING

A claim by such a person would clearly

give the insurer notice of the extinguishment of the former wife/beneficiary’s interest in

the policy and of the existence of a claim by one other than the beneficiary designated in

the policy. Thus, “other person” logically means a person other than the claimant

(beneficiary) already known to the insurer.

WRITTEN NOTICE NEEDED

Absent written notice of a claim under the

policy by one of the persons identified in the statute before making payment on its policy,

the insurer is discharged of all liability on the policy for payment of its proceeds in

accordance with the terms of the policy.

MOST IMPORTANT TO LET THE INSURANCE COMPANY OFF THE HOOK

This interpretation advances the clear purpose

of the statutory language at issue, which is to protect an insurer that pays its policy

proceeds in accordance with the terms of the policy absent the requisite notice of a claim

by someone other than the beneficiary designated in the policy. In my view, the plain

language of the statute mandates this conclusion. [Id. at 675-676; emphasis in original

(FITZGERALD, J., dissenting).]



HATHAWAY, J., would grant leave to appeal.



Posted 06/15/2010 here by

Terry R. Bankert

A Flint Michigan Divorce Lawyer

http://attorneybankert.com/

Or

http://dumpmyspouse.com/